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CASE COMMENT
COPYRIGHT LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
IN CYBERSPACE
A & MRecords, Inc. v. Napster,Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
Stacey N. Penn'

Appellant was a start up company accused of contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement.' Appellant's file-sharing software, distributed via
its Internet website Napster, enabled users to share MP32 files without
payment.3 Appellees were record companies and music publishers holding
various copyrights in music and sound recordings.4 Appellees filed suit in
the United States District Court under 17 U.S.C. § 501.' Appellees alleged
that appellant was liable for the infringement of Napster users who were
downloading and uploading MP3 files of appellees' copyrighted music.6
Appellant claimed that it was not liable because Napster users engaged in

fair use and substantial non-infringing use of the music files.7 The district
court found that Napster users engaged in direct infringement and were not
fair users. The U.S. District Court issued a preliminary injunction against

* University of Florida, J.D. Candidate 2003, Levin College of Law. The author wishes
to thank her family and friends for all of their continuing support and encouragement.
1. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. MP3 is the standard file format for the digital storage of audio recordings. Id. Digital
MP3 files are created by compressing compact disk (CD) audio information and copying it directly
onto a computer hard drive. Id. The MP3's compressed format allows for rapid transmission of
digital audio files from one computer to another. Id.
3. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
4. Id. at 900.
5. Id. at 900-01. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) states that "anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 ... is an infringer of the
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2001).
6. See A & M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900-01. Music refers to both musical
compositions and sound recordings. Id. at 900 n. I.
7. Id. Appellant also claimed affirmative defenses of waiver, implied license and misuse,
and sought statutory protection in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), and
the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1008. A & MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1024-27.
The U.S. District Court conclusively dismissed each of these defenses, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. Id.
8. A & MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1013-14.
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appellant.9 The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. 0
Affirming on appeal, the Ninth Circuit HELD appellees demonstrated a
likelihood of success on their claims of contributory and vicarious liability
and reinstated the injunction."
Before proceeding on a claim of contributory or vicarious infringement,
a plaintiff must first establish direct copyright infringement.' 2 Direct
copyright infringement is shown by ownership in a valid copyright and
proof that the defendant violated one of the exclusive rights 3 of the
copyright holder.' 4 Violators of exclusive rights are relieved from
infringement liability upon establishing a fair use defense." The four factors
that establish fair use are (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount of the copyrighted work the
defendant used, and (4) the effect of the use on potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.' 6 No single factor is determinative in
isolation; all factors must be weighed together on a case by case basis."
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,"8 the U.S.
Supreme Court related the fair use defense to technological advances.' 9 The
Sony Court found no copyright infringement liability for defendants who
manufactured and marketed video tape recorders (VTRs) capable of
recording copyrighted works. 20 The Sony Court reasoned that the first
factor, the purpose and use of the VTR, was noncommercial, nonprofit
9. Id. at 1015. A preliminary injunction is the proper relief for a party who demonstrates
"a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm." A & M
Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911 n.1. "In a copyright infringement case, demonstration of a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm." Id. at
911 n.2.
10. A & MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 101l.
11. Id. at 1022, 1024, 1029.

12. Id. at 1020-24.
13. Exclusive rights include the right (I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership; (4) to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and (6) to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of audio transmission. 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
14. Id. § 501(a).
15. Id. § 107.
16. Id.
17. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
18. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
19. See id. at 447-56.
20. Id. at 456. In Sony, the plaintiffs asserted.that the defendants were liable for VTR users
who directly infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights by recording television programs from commercial
television. Id. at 418.
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activity since the VTRs primary use, time-shifting,2 was for private home
use.22 In addition, the Sony Court evaluated the third factor and determined
that the defendants reproduced the entire work.2 3 Finally, the Sony Court
found no evidence of actual past or potential future harm to the market for
the copyrighted works. 24 The' Sony Court concluded that the
noncommercial purpose of the VTR plus the lack of market harm to the
copyrighted work demonstrated fair use and defeated the direct
infringement claim. 5
After Sony, courts changed the fair use analysis focusing on concerns
raised by the Sony dissent. 26 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,2 the
Court analyzed the first factor, focusing not only on whether the use was
commercial, but also on whether the new use was transformative. 29 In
Campbell, the plaintiff record company filed suit against the defendant
music group and alleged that the defendant's song directly infiinged one of
the plaintiff's copyrighted songs.29 The CampbellCourt determined that the
more transformative a work, the less significantly the other factors, such as
commercialism, would weigh against fair use." Upon application of the
four fair use factors, the CampbellCourt found that although the defendant
was making commercial use of the copyrighted work, the defendant's new
use was transformative, and thus a fair use.3

21. "Time-shifting" was the process of using the VTR to record a program that could not
be viewed as it was televised, and then watching it at a later time. Id. at 421.
22. id. at 449.
23. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 449-50.
24. Id. at 451-55.
25. Id. at 456.
26. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994); Worldwide
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2000) (focusing
on whether or not the new work was transformative of the copyrighted work); see also Sony Corp.
of Am., 464 U.S. at 478-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that all recognized fair uses
reflected a common theme of productive use of copyrighted works).
27. Campbell,510 U.S. at 569.
28. Id. at 579-85. "Transformative" works were those that "addled] something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message." Id. at 579.
29. Id. at 573.
30. Id. at 579; but see Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 449 (stating that commercial or profitmaking purpose holds a presumption of unfair use). According to the Campbell Court,
transformative works were at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space
within copyright confines. Campbell,510 U.S. at 579. Transformative works furthered the primary
goal of copyright, which was to promote science and the arts. Id.
31. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594.
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Following Sony, courts also changed the interpretation of commercial
use.3" The U.S. Supreme Court moved from its Sony interpretation of
commercial use where it referred to monetary gain, to finding commercial
use when a user stood to profit from exploitation of copyrighted material.33
The Ninth Circuit took this interpretation so far as to find commercial use
by a non-profit organization. 4
Once direct copyright infringement is established and the defendant is
found not to be a fair user, courts can then determine contributory and
vicarious copyright liability." The Sony Court considered contributory and
vicarious liability together as general third party liability." The Sony Court
focused on whether the defendant had control over the infringing use and
whether the defendant had constructive knowledge of its customer's
infringement.37 The Sony Court found that the defendant did not have
control over users' infringement since the sale and advertisement of the
VTR did not encourage infringing use.38 The Sony Court further found that
the defendant had no constructive knowledge because the VTR was
capable of the substantial non-infringing use39 of time-shifing.4 ° Thus the
Sony Court concluded that the defendants were not liable for VTR users'
infringement.4'
After Sony, the Ninth Circuit, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,

Inc.,42 distinguished separate elements for contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement.43 Contributory infringement occurred when the
defendant knew of the infringing conduct and induced, caused, or materially
contributed to the infringement." Vicarious infringement liability existed

32. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985);
Worldwide Church ofGod, 227 F.3d at 1117-18.
33. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 562.
34. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117-18.

35. See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
36. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984).
37. Id. at 437-39.
38. Id. at 437-38.
39. "The sale of copying equipment... does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes." Id. at 442.
40. Id. at 439-42. The Sony Court concluded that time-shifting was a substantial noninfringing use because the plaintiffs only represented less than 10% of copyrighted programs
capable of time shifting and that many other copyright owners authorized and welcomed the
practice of time-shifting. Id. at 443.
41. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 456.

42. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
43. See id. at 262-63.
44. Id. at 264.
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when the defendant had the right and ability to supervise, and had a direct
financial interest in the infringing activity. 5
In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit found the defendant liable for both
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.46 In Fonovisa, the
plaintiffmusic company alleged that the defendant, a swap meet owner, was
liable because defendant's vendors were directly infringing by selling
counterfeit copyrighted recordings.47 The Fonovisa court found that the
defendant was contributorily liable because the defendant had actual
knowledge of the infringing activity and materially contributed by providing
the site and facility. 4s The Fonovisa court found that the defendant was
vicariously liable since they had the right to terminate the vendors for any
reason, and through that control had the ability to supervise.4 9 The
Fonovisa court also found that the defendant reaped financial benefits
because the counterfeit recordings acted as a draw for swap meet
customers.50
In the instant case, the decision of the Ninth Circuit closely follows
traditional copyright analysis and subjects intellectual property in
cyberspace to the same legal analysis of that in real space. 5 1 As with all

claims of contributory and vicarious liability, the instant court first

determined whether appellant's users had directly infringed.52 Upon finding

direct infringement, the instant court addressed appellant's fair use
defense."

45. Id. at 262.
46. Id. at 263-64.

47. Fonovisa,76 F.3d at 261.
48. Id. at 264. Defendant had knowledge because in 1991 the Swap Meet was raided and
38,000 counterfeit recordings were seized and then two years later an investigator again observed
more counterfeit sales. Id. at 261. Defendant materially contributed by providing its vendors with
support services including, inter alia, space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and
customers.
49. Id. at 262-64.
50. Id. at 263.
51. Stephanie Greene, ReconcilingNapster with the Sony Decision andRecentAmendments
to Copyright Law, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 57, 60 (2001).
52. A.& M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 10 14. The instant court concluded that the appellees had sufficiently demonstrated
ownership by producing evidence of copyrights in as much as 87% of the MP3 files available on

Napster. Id. at 1013. The instant court found that Napster users violated appellees' exclusive
rights in two ways. Id. at 1014. First, the instant court found that Napster users who uploaded files
for others to copy violated appellees' distribution rights. Id. at 1014. Second, the instant court
found that users who download copyrighted music violated appellees' reproduction rights. Id. at
1014.
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Appellant alleged that its system had three fair uses: sampling, spaceshifting, and permissive distribution by new and established artists.' The
instant court found that each factor of the defense weighed against finding
fair use." Evaluating the first factor, the instant court concluded that
downloading MP3 files did not transform the work and Napster users were
engaged in a commercial use of the copyrighted works.56 For the second
and third factors the instant court found that musical works were creative
in nature and that Napster users were downloading them in their entirety. 7

Finally, in applying the last factor, the instant court determined Napster
harmed the market for appellees' works by reducing CD sales among

college students, and by raising barriers to appellees' entry into the digital
downloading market."8 Thus, the instant court concluded appellant had not
satisfactorily presented a fair use defense.59

Next, the instant court addressed appellees' contributory infringement
claim, applying the elements of knowledge and material contribution.' The

instant court determined that appellant had both actual and constructive
knowledge of Napster users' direct infringement. 61 The instant court also
found that appellant materially contributed to Napster users' infringement

by providing the site and facility for.infringing activity. 62 The instant court
54. Id. "Sampling" occurs when users make temporary copies of a work before purchasing;
"space-shifting" occurs when users access a sound recording that they already own in audio CD
format through the Napster system. Id. at 1014. "Permissive distribution by new and established
artists" was what appellant called its New Artist Program. Id. at 1019. The instant court found
that the New Artist Program was a non-infringing use and that appellees were not seeking to
enjoin this use. Id. Thus the instant court did not consider the New Artist Program when it
determined appellant's fair use defense. Id.
55. Id. at 1014-15.
56. Id. at 1015.
57. A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1016.
58. Id. at 1016.
59. Seeid. at 1017.
60. Id. at 1019-22.
61. Id. at 1020. The instant court found that appellant had actual knowledge because: (1)
a document authored by aNapster, Inc. co-founder mentioned a need to remain ignorant of users'
real names and IP addresses because the users were exchanging pirated music; and (2) the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) had informed appellant of more than 12,000
infringing files on the Napster system. Id. at 1020 n.5. The instant court found that appellant had
constructive knowledge of the direct infringement because: (I) appellant's executives had
recording industry experience; (2) appellant had enforced intellectual property rights in other
instances; (3) appellant's executives had downloaded copyrighted songs by using the Napster
system; and (4) appellant had promoted the Napster web site using infringing files. Id.
62. A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1022. The instant court affirmed the district court's
conclusion that "without the support services [Appellant) provides, Napster users could not find
and download the music they want with the ease of which [Appellant] boasts." Id.
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concluded that appellees had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits of the contributory infringement claim.63
Finally, the instant court evaluated appellees' vicarious infringement
claim by examining the factors of financial benefit and supervision.' The
instant court found that appellant's future revenue was directly dependent
onNapster users' infringement of appellees' music.6 Thus, the instant court
found that appellant received a financial benefit. 6 The instant court also
determined that since appellant had the ability to locate infringing material
on the Napster search indices, appellant thus had the ability to supervise its
users. 7 Based on its review, the instant court concluded that appellees
demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim of vicarious liability.68
Thus, the instant court found a preliminary injunction was not only
warranted, but required.69
On appeal, appellant conceded its users were directly infringing
appellees' music.7" Appellant, however, hoped to find legal refuge in Sony's
finding of fair use.7 Unfortunately for appellant, the instant court applied
a stricter interpretation when evaluating appellant's fair use defense.72
The purpose and use of the Napster system and the VTR were similar
in that both involved mechanical copying." In determining purpose and use,
the Sony Court only focused on whether the use was personal or for
profit.74 The Sony Court found that the time-shifting use of the VTR was
personal because most users only enjoyed the copyrighted material at
home." Appellant claimed that the Napster use of space shifting was
synonymous with the VTR's time-shifting, and thus demonstrated a fair use

63. Id.

64. See id. at 1022-24.
65. Id. at 1023-24. The instant court found that appellant's future revenue was directly
dependent on increases in userbase and that userbase increased as quality and quantity of
available music increased. Id. at 1023 (indicating that the more copyrighted music that was
available for free, the more users would visit and use the Napster site).

66. Id. at 1023.
67. Id. at 1023-24.
68. A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1024.

69. Id. at 1027; see supratext accompanying note 9. Despite minor changes to the district
court's original injunction, the instant court affirmed that appellant was preliminarily enjoined
from engaging in or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or
distributing copyrighted music. See id. at 1027-29.
70. See id. at 1013.

71. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
72. SeeA & MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1014-19.

73. Greene, supra note 51, at 73.
74. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1984).
75. See id. at 448.
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of the copyrighted music.7' The instant court, however, found that spaceshifting was not a personal use since Napster users distributed copyrighted
music to the general public."
The instant court ultimately followed Campbell and later cases'
interpretations of the purpose and use factor. 7'8 Following the Campbell
Court, the instant court analyzed the transformative nature of the use of the
copyrighted work.' The instant court determined that downloaded MP3
files were not transformative at all since users added no new aesthetics,
insights, or understanding to the original.8' The instant court then
determined that Napster use was commercial." Had the instant court
applied the Sony Court's profit making interpretation, the purpose and use
factor may have weighed in appellant's favor since appellant collected no
revenue and charged no fee. 2 Instead, the instant court followed the later
courts' broad interpretations and found commercial use demonstrated by
Napster users' exploitation of the copyrighted music.83 The instant court
found Napster users profited by the infringement because it saved users the
expense of purchasing authorized copies.'
The second and third factors 5 of the defense also weighed against a fair
use finding for appellant." The instant court determined that the
copyrighted music was creative in nature, thus closer to the essence of
copyright protection."' The instant court also determined that Napster users
engaged in wholesale copying ofappellee's entire copyrighted work, which
weighed against a finding of fair use." The instant court's finding appeared
contrary to the Sony Court's fair use finding when similar works were

76. SeeA & MReords. Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915.
77. SeeA & MRecords Inc., 239 F.3d at 1019.
78. See id. at 1015-16.
79. Id.at 1015.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Napster users uploaded and downloaded MP3 files without payment to each other, appellant, or
appellees. Id.at 901.
83. SeeA&MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at O15.
84. See id.
85. See supra text accompanying note 16.
86. Greene, supra note 51, at 70-71.
87. A & M Records. Inc., 239 F.3d at 1016. The primary goal of copyright is to promote
science and the arts. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
88. SeeA & MRecords. Inc., 239 F.3d at 1016.
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copied in their entirety." However, the Sony Court found that VTR users,
unlike Napster users, had been invited by the copyright holder to enjoy the
copyrighted works for free prior to copying them. 90
Once the instant court characterized Napster use as commercial, the
Sony decision left appellant's fair use defense little chance of surviving the
fourth factor analysis. 9' The Sony Court held that commercial use is
presumptive of the likelihood of market harm.' However, the Campbell
Court found fair use where there was commercial use of a copyrighted
work, thus appellant still had hope following Campbell. 3
Appellant claimed that Napster's sampling use actually helped the
market for appellees by stimulating CD sales." The instant court, however,
found sampling adversely affected the market for appellees' copyrighted
works in two ways.9s First, the instant court concluded that Napster use
reduced CD sales among college students." The instant court relied on two
of appellees' expert reports showing that the more songs Napster users
downloaded, the less likely they were to purchase the music. 97 Second, the
instant court found that free sampling of appellees' copyrighted music on
Napster adversely affected appellees' actual or planned entry into the digital
downloading market. 9 The instant court found that consumers were more

89. Compare id. at 1019 with Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
448 (1984) (finding fair use in Sony where a copyrighted work was used in its entirety, and
finding no fair use in Napster where work used in its entirety).
90. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 449-50; see A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114
F. Supp. 2d 896,913 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The district court determined that appellees almost always
charged for their downloaded music and they only made promotional downloads available on a
highly restricted basis. Id.
91. See Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 451.
92. See id.
93. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,594 (1994). The Campbell Court
held that no single factor was determinative in isolation; rather all factors must be weighed
together before a determination could be made. See id. at 577-78.
94. A & M Records, Inc., 1 14 F. Supp. 2d at 896. Appellant submitted an expert report (the
Fader Report) that, based on an online survey, indicated that Napster use was associated with
overall increases in CD purchases. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 11070106, *7
(N.D. Cal. 2000). However, the instant court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
Fader Report lacked objective data and that its administration had not been properly overseen. A
& M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the instant court
chose not to rely on the Fader report when it rendered its decision. Id.
95. A & MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1016.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1016-17.
98. See id. at 1016.
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likely to choose the free Napster service over appellees' pay-per-download

sites."
After the instant court determined that Napster users had no fair use
defense, it considered appellant's contributory liability."°° The instant court
applied the Fonovisaelements of knowledge and material contribution.'
Appellant again tried to find shelter in Sony and claimed a defense of
03 non-infringing use,'0 2 but the instant court rejected that defense
substantial
well.'
as
The instant court found that appellant had actual and constructive
knowledge of, and materially contributed to, Napster users' infringement.' "
The instant court distinguished the Sony defendant's constructive
knowledge of possible infringing use from appellant's actual knowledge.' 5
Appellant actually knew of ongoing infringement, as it occurred, thus the
instant court found Napster's non-infringing uses were not substantial
enough to protect against liability.' °6The instant court also found appellant
materially contributed to the infringement in the same way the defendant
swap meet had in Fonovisa. °7 According to the instant court, the
proprietary software, search engines, servers, and means for inter-user
computer connections appellant provided were synonymous with the
support services like parking, booth space, advertising, and clientele the
Fonovisadefendant provided.' 0 '
The instant court further followed Fonovisa,determining that appellant
was vicariously liable."0 ' The instant court found that appellant had the
discretionary right to terminate user accounts in the same way the Fonovisa
0 Because appellant had
defendant had the right to terminate its vendors.°"

99. See id. at 1017;seeA & MRecords, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at910.
100. A & MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1019.
101. See id. at 1019-22.
102. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
103. See A & M Records. Inc., 239 F.3d at 1020-22. The instant court found that although
the Napster system might be capable of future significant non-infringing uses, the evidence
supported that finding that appellant knew or had reason to know of Napster users' infringement.
See id. at 1021.
104. Id. at 1020-22.
105. id. at 1020.
106. Id. at 1021-22. The RIAA had informed appellant of over 12,000 infringing files
available on the Napster system and the same infringing files were still available on Napster when
appellees brought their claim for infringement liability. Id. at 1022 n.6.
107. See id at 1022; A & MRecords. Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
108. SeeA & MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1022;A & MRecords, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at
919.
109. A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1023-24.
110. See id.1023.
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the right to terminate accounts, it had control over Napster users."' The
instant court also determined that appellant received financial benefit in the
same.way as the Fonovisadefendant. "' Infringing music on Napster enticed
Napster users3 in the same way that counterfeit recordings drew swap meet
customers.1
Enjoining appellant may have been a victory for the appellees, but the
battle was not won." 4 Napster created an expectation of free music
dowldoads and furthered the attitude that online music should be free."'
With free MP3 music files available elsewhere in cyberspace, appellant
might not be the only obstacle to appellees lucrative welcome into the
digital downloading market." 6

III. See id.
112. See id.; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
113. See A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1023; Fonovisa,Inc., 76 F.3d at 263.
114. See A & M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1029; A & M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at
911 n.16.
115. A & MRecords, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 910-11.
116. Seeid. at910-11, 911 n.16.

